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Less Trust Means More Trusts
Bridget J. Crawford*
Abstract
The word “trust” has multiple meanings. In everyday speech, it
refers to a feeling of confidence associated with integrity, such as
trusting that a friend will keep a secret. In the financial context,
some law students, lawyers and lucky individuals also understand
that a trust is a near-magical device that splits legal and equitable
title. A trustee holds formal legal title to property for the benefit of
a beneficiary simply because the grantor declares it to be so. By
turning the spotlight on “trust,” in both senses of the word, one can
discern fault lines in contemporary U.S. political and legal
structures. These are made even plainer when examined through
the lens of ongoing litigation involving human embryos created by
actress Sofia Vergara and her former fiancé.
Just as termites can enter homes through foundational cracks
or wood brought from the outside, interpersonal, community or
structural confidence may erode in the face of hostility, indifference
or inequality. Similarly, as termites can slowly damage a home over
a period of years before the harm becomes visible, the beneficial
form of ownership known as a trust gradually–and then suddenly–
has morphed almost beyond recognition over the last twenty-five
years. Eaten away are the traditional limitations on trust duration,
trust modification and the type of property that can be held in trust.
In some states, irrevocable trusts can last forever, be decanted to
another trust with entirely different terms, or even hold legal “title”
to human embryos. These changes to centuries of trust law reveal
changing attitudes about wealth, property ownership, and personal
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autonomy. If society truly values equal opportunity for all people,
then trust–and trusts–need attention.
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I. Introduction
The word “trust” has multiple meanings. In everyday speech,
it refers to a feeling of confidence associated with integrity, such
as trusting that a friend will keep a secret.1 When passengers
board an airplane, they trust that the pilot is qualified and
competent.2 Trust also is the fragile and vulnerable precondition
for democracy’s existence.3 Just as wood girds a house, trust girds
1. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Linda Tripp Deserves to Be Prosecuted, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 25, 1999, at A39 (detailing Monica Lewinsky’s misplaced trust in her “friend”
Linda Tripp who, at the behest of law enforcement, recorded conversations about
Lewinsky’s relationship with President Clinton).
2. Bill Murphy, Jr., American Airlines Flight Was Canceled for a Truly
Insane Reason (Hint: It's the Last Thing Any Passenger Ever Wants to Hear About
the Pilot), INC. (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/an-americanairlines-flight-was-just-canceled-for-a-truly-insane-reason-hint-its-last-thingany-passenger-ever-wants-to-hear-about-pilot.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019)
(reporting on the removal of an American Airlines pilot in Manchester, England
on the suspicion of being intoxicated) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
3. See, e.g., Mark Warren, Trust and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK

76

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 74 (2019)

a society. Thomas Jefferson knew it.4 Alexander Hamilton knew
it.5 Both men understood trust as foundational to government,
although they had different views on who could be trusted to lead.6
Both would have agreed that trust must flow at a minimal rate
from the government to the people and from the people back to the
government, as well as among the people. Otherwise, We the People
lose confidence in the political and legal structures that are
fundamental to society.7
Although the comparison may surprise at first, trust—in the
plain-meaning sense and in a political sense—connects deeply to
the legal device known as a trust. Law students, lawyers and lucky
individuals understand that a trust is a near-magical device,
splitting legal and equitable title between a trustee and a
beneficiary.8 A trustee holds formal legal title to property for the
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST

75 (Eric M. Uslander ed., 2018) (“Democracy and
trust have an essential but paradoxical relationship to one another. . . . Trust in
governments enables citizens to provide collectively conditions for good lives. Yet
the institutions of democracy were founded on distrust, especially of the
powerful.”).
4. Thomas Jefferson identified two groups in the early nation: “[T]hose who
fear and distrust the people . . . [and] those who identify themselves with the
people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest
and safe . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, 10 August 1824,
FOUNDERS
EARLY
ACCESS,
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-0402-02-4451 (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. Alexander Hamilton imagined a sort of ruling class with greater
authority and rights to participate in a democratic government. Hamilton said
that communities naturally divided into “the few” and “the many.” 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(statement of Alexander Hamilton at Constitutional Convention). Hamilton
believed that the “few” (whom he called “rich and well-born”) would effectively
check any improper impulses of the masses. Id.
6. See generally JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY
THAT FORGED A NATION xv (2013) (“Politics in the broadest framework is likely to
witness continuing divisions over the competing ideas that set Jefferson and
Hamilton at odds.”).
7. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANEIL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE
77 (2018) (“The erosion of democracy takes place piecemeal, often in baby steps.
Each individual step seems minor—none appears to truly threaten democracy.
Indeed, government moves to subvert democracy frequently enjoy a veneer of
legality.”).
8. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 116–17 (2013) (describing the trust’s split of
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benefit of a beneficiary, simply because the grantor declares it to
be so.9 The extent to which a society does (or does not) tolerate
trusts is a measure of the health of that society’s political and legal
structures, to a certain extent.
Part II of this Essay employs the metaphor of termites eating
away at a building to explain how the erosion of trust can damage
any relationship, community or society. Part III argues that a lack
of trust in the legal system gave rise to the legal device for
preserving or transferring assets known as the trust. Trust law has
been relatively stable for centuries, but over the last twenty-five
years, major changes to trust law have transformed these
tradition-bound vehicles almost beyond recognition. Yet still trusts
flourish because of a lack of trust. Part IV explores the function of
trusts in contemporary U.S. society, given that certain types of
trusts perpetuate wealth inequality. Although trusts that keep
rich people rich are the subject of the greatest criticism, Part V of
this Essay argues that Louisiana’s unusual trust law—which
permits human embryos to be held in trust and to have legal
standing—presents a greater challenge to the legal system. The
effect of the Louisiana law is to push good-faith debate out of
venues in which ordinary citizens can participate into the esoteric
world of “money law” specialists instead.10
II. The Nature of Termites and Trust(s)
Termites can enter buildings from the outside.11 They make
tunnels through the ground, up the concrete foundation and into
the wood of the structure.12 Termites might also enter homes
legal and equitable title between the trustee and the beneficiaries).
9. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(requiring trust to be administered for benefit of beneficiaries).
10. This is Alice Abreu’s wonderful phrase. See Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts:
Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 575, 575 n.1 (2001) (“By
‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed as comprising the business
curriculum: tax, corporations, securities, commercial law (UCC), securities,
banking, antitrust and the like.”).
11. JOHN TYLER BONNER, CELLS AND SOCIETIES 76 (1955) (describing
pathways by which termites may enter a structure from the outside).
12. Theodore A. Evans et al., Termites Eavesdrop to Avoid Competitors,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, Nov. 22 2009, at
4035, 4035–36 (describing difference between subterranean termites,
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through wood brought from the outside.13 Thus termites from the
outside essentially can “attack” a property that previously was
termite-free.14 Alternately, a structure might be infested with
termites from the day it is built, if the wood used in its construction
already contains the insects.15
Termites can lurk in wood for many years and years before
their damage becomes visible.16 After making hundreds,
thousands, and millions of little bites—bites imperceptible when
made one by one—just a few of these tiny creatures can destroy an
entire building.17 As a thought experiment, consider the
capabilities of one termite. A single insect would need over 3,000
years to eat all of the wood in a home of 1,000 square feet in size
(the average termite’s lifespan is only two years).18 But because
termites live in colonies of millions, and multiple colonies may be
found in the same structure, destruction can occur rapidly. By the
time the property owner sees physical evidence of termite damage,
the structure already may be beyond repair.19
Using termites as a metaphor, one can gauge the level of trust
in any community. Trust within any group of any size—no less
between and among the people and political and legal leaders—can
erode bite by bite from termites on the inside. It happens in
workplaces, where colleagues pass each other in the hallway and
do not say hello or make eye contact because of some perceived
wrongdoing, whether years in the past or yesterday. That type of
behavior is uncivil and eats away at the workplace culture, just as
termites eat away at wood. Similarly, trust can erode in families
and in personal relationships by forgetting to thank someone for
Coptotermes, and drywood termites, Cryptotermes).
13. Id. at 436 (explaining behavior of Cyprtotermes).
14. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., C. A. Kofoid, The Fight Against Termites, 3 SCI. MONTHLY 275,
275 (1935) (noting that lumber in homes provides termites with even more
desirable food than wood that has naturally died).
16. See, e.g., Comparing Methods for Termite Treatment, DAILY HERALD, Nov.
23, 2018, at 2 (observing that termites “can go unnoticed for years”).
17. See, e.g., How Fast Do Termites Eat Wood? TERMINIX (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.terminix.com/termite-control/termite-facts (last visited Mar. 30,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Id. (estimating time that one termite would need to eat small house).
19. Id.
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doing an errand,20 or failing to say, “I’m sorry,”21 when an apology
is appropriate.22 Trust erodes in a social group, when one remains
silent in the face of remarks that discriminate against some
members.23 Just as any one termite bite does not cause much
damage to a building, any one incident of incivility, hostility, lack
of gratitude, or dishonesty will not cause a community to become
toxic or make political or legal systems unstable, to be sure. But
through accumulated termite bites, the insects will destroy an
entire structure, fracture a workplace, family, community, or
political and legal systems.24
III. Trust and Trusts
A. The Origins of Trusts
One need not be a legal historian to understand that trusts
were invented to do an end-run around the law.25 A quick glance
at one popular law school Trusts & Estates casebook reveals that
from inception, the use—the precursor to the trust—was
established for the sole purpose of getting around certain rules.26
20. See, e.g., Lisa A. Williams & Monica Y. Bartlett, Warm Thanks:
Gratitude Expression Facilitates Social Affiliation in New Relationships Via
Perceived Warmth, 15 EMOTION 1 (2015) (demonstrating empirical relationship
between expressions of gratitude and positive perception by others).
21. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1009, 1010 (1999) (“Parents, or at least good parents, teach children to take
responsibility when they have wronged another: Apologize and make amends. In
contrast, lawyers typically counsel the opposite.”).
22. See, e.g., Kenneth Cloke, Designing Heart-Based Systems to Encourage
Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Divorcing Families, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 418, 424
(2015) (“Forgiveness is not something you do for someone else . . . .”).
23. Beverly Tatum, Breaking the Silence, in WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL
READINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 147, 147 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 3d ed.
2008) (advocating for more explicit discussion about race in order to minimize
racially-motivated violence).
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing structural damage
effectuated by many termites over comparatively shorter period of time).
25. See GEORGE C. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TRUSTS 6, n.14 (5th ed. 1973) (attributing the origins of the trust to the
fideicommissum of ancient Rome).
26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS &
ESTATES 386 (10th ed. 2017) (“Because the friars were forbidden to own property,
benefactors conveyed land to friends of the friars, to hold to the use of the friars.”).
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Specifically, in the thirteenth century in England, the Franciscan
order prevented its mendicant friars from owning any property.27
But because the monks needed stable places to live and worship,
the Franciscans occasionally identified a wealthy patron who
would convey land to a third party to hold the property for the
benefit of the friars, who could then use it for their own purposes.28
Once the use became widely known, wealthy people began
employing it to avoid feudal incidents, or a type of tax obligation.29
Thus, it is fair to say that the history of trusts always—or for at
least a very long time—has been intertwined with some type of
avoidance.30 Trusts are legal instruments that meet the needs of
those who proclaim, “I don’t like or trust the system, so let’s figure
a way around the rules.”
B. Contemporary Trusts
Fast-forward about 900 years—with apologies to the actual
legal historians—and trusts are alive and well in the twenty-first
century. Trusts in this country hold trillions of dollars worth of
assets.31 At the most basic level, trusts allow rich people to stay
rich, because if money is held in a perpetual trust, it need not ever
vest in any beneficiary.32 Absent vesting (and inclusion in
someone’s taxable estate), there will never be an additional tax—
27. See, e.g., F. W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130
(1894).
28. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 26, at 386 (explaining arrangement
among feoffor to uses [analogous to the donor] for the benefit of the cestui que use,
the friars [analogous to a beneficiary]).
29. Id. at 387.
30. But see Grayson M. P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against
Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291 (2013) (tracing explosion in use of long-term
trusts to the 1986 enactment of the generation-skipping transfer tax).
31. See, e.g., John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion
Wealth Transfer Estimate Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7
J. GIFT PLAN. 11 (Jan. 2003) (evaluating prediction that for years 1998 through
2052, wealthy individuals will transfer up to $41 trillion by way of private express
trusts).
32. See, e.g., Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implications of SelfSettled Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Can You Really Have Your Cake and
Eat It Too? 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 25, 50–57 (2009) (explaining role of estate tax
inclusion of trust assets in wealth transfer tax system).
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beyond the tax on the initial transfer in trust—imposed on the
movement of wealth from one generation to or for the benefit of
another.33
To be sure, there is a category of trusts that has nothing to do
with tax avoidance or doing an “end-run” around that law.34 Those
are trusts for beneficiaries who do not have sufficient capacity to
own or manage property themselves.35 That may be by virtue of
being too young—they simply are not old enough to own property36
—or the beneficiary may be suffering from some sort of
neurological difference that makes that person unable to manage
assets.37 These trusts are functional, desirable, efficient
alternatives to expensive court-appointed guardianships or
custodianships.38 They allow families to ensure a minimal level of
financial resources for loved ones.39 This Essay brackets those
trusts out of the discussion entirely.
In the case of trusts that are designed to keep rich people rich,
three very curious things have happened in the United States in
the last twenty-five years. These have revolutionized trust law
more than anything else in the last 400 years: the rise of self33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Kristen M. Lewis, Planning Challenges for Beneficiaries with
Special Needs, 46 EST. PLAN. 14 (2019) (detailing reasons for transfers of assets
in trust for the benefit of a physically or mentally disabled individual).
35.
See, e.g., John M. Hemenway, Effective Estate Planning for the Modern
Family in Uncertain Times, ASPATORE 2013 WL 9711 at *6–7 (describing minors’
legal inability to own property outright and use of minority trusts in certain nontaxable estates).
36. These so-called “minority trusts” typically provide for property to be held
in trust until the beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one (21) years. See, e.g.,
James S. Sligar & Bridget J. Crawford, Form 6, in DAVID WESTPHALL & GEORGE
MAIR, ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION A-42 (4th ed. 2003) (providing for
entrustment of any property passing to a beneficiary under the age of 21).
37. See, e.g., Chadwick Allen Harp, Estate Planning for the Disabled
Beneficiary, 11 APR. PROB. & PROP. 14, 14–15 (1997) (describing use of trusts for
disabled beneficiaries and desirability of maintaining beneficiary’s eligibility for
governmental benefits).
38. See, e.g., Allen D. Webster & Douglas K. Riley, Estate Planning for the
Family with a Disabled Child, 14 VT. L. REV. 529, 540 (1990) (describing time,
cost and restrictions associated with a court-appointed guardian for a minor or
disabled beneficiary).
39. See, e.g., Stephanie R. Hoffer, Making the Law More ABLE: Reforming
Medicaid for Disability, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1255 (2015) (describing obstacles faced
by disabled individuals seeking to become eligible for certain federal benefits).
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settled asset protection trusts,40 the proliferation of trust
decanting rules41 and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities42
in over half of the jurisdictions in the nation.43 Each of these
changes is, has been, and will continue to be the subject of study
and scrutiny.44
In order to focus the discussion of trust and trusts, consider the
rule against perpetuities. Law professors, law students, and
lawyers learn to hate the rule because it is befuddling, confusing,
and a minefield for professional errors.45 Depending on the
jurisdiction where they find themselves, some members of the
same population then may herald the rule’s repeal, rejoicing that
they no longer have to teach it, learn it, or risk making a costly
professional mistake.46
40. See generally RICHARD W. NENNO & JOHN E. SULLIVAN III, 868 T.M.
DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS at I.C. (defining an asset protection trust as
one created by the settlor “in which the settlor may retain some potential benefits
that cannot be reached by creditors” of the settlor). Prior to 1997, asset protection
trusts were not able to be created in any U.S. jurisdiction, but now are permitted
by Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
41. See generally WILLIAM R. CULP, JR. & BRIANI BENNETT MELLEN, TRUST
DECANTING, 871 T.M. TRUST DECANTING at I.A. (explaining decanting as “the
distribution of trust property from one trust to another pursuant to a trustee's
discretionary power to make distributions to or for the benefit of one or more
beneficiaries”).
42. The rule against perpetuities is the rule “prohibiting a grant of an estate
unless the interest must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years . . . after the death
of some person alive when the interest was created.” Rule Against Perpetuities,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER P. CLINE, T.M. 838 DYNASTY TRUSTS 2d ed. at II.C.
(classifying states into groups according to their rules against perpetuities).
44. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (calling repeal of rule against
perpetuities a “race to the bottom”).
45. Professor Barton Leach famously commented that the rule against
perpetuities was “so abstruse that it is misunderstood by a substantial percentage
of those who advise the public . . . [and] so capricious that it strikes down in the
name of public order gifts which offer no offense except that they are couched in
the wrong words.” W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 722 (1952).
46. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or
The RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 656 (2000)
(asserting that the rule against perpetuities “is hard to learn, and students are
customers now. Why risk bad evaluations when teaching sexy topics is so easy?”);
Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against
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In 1997, the Alaska legislature passed a law that provided, in
essence, that trusts could last forever.47 Jonathan Blattmachr,
then a partner at Milbank LLP,48 was one of the principal drafters
of the perpetuities repeal legislation in Alaska.49 Blattmachr’s
motivation to work on repeal legislation stemmed from a growing
awareness that his clients were establishing trusts in foreign
jurisdictions to take advantage of laws that permitted self-settled
asset protection trusts and perpetual trusts.50 He thought that a
domestic venue would be more reliable; he focused on Alaska
because of the relatively small and cohesive bar in that state and
because it was less tradition-bound than his home state of New
York.51 Alaska Governor Tony Knowles signed the bill into law on
April 1, 1997.52
After the passage of the Alaska legislation, jurisdictions like
Delaware, South Dakota and a variety of other states modernized
or radically altered their trust laws.53 Now, in over half of the
jurisdictions in the U.S., an individual can create a trust that lasts
forever (or at least for the lifetimes of many more successive
generations than any common law perpetuities period would
permit).54
Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545 (1988) (lamenting the rule against
perpetuities as “one of the most difficult areas of our law”).
47. See Alaska Trust Act, H.B. 101, 20th Leg. Sess. (1997); ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.27.050(a) (allowing abolition of the rule in trusts where the trustee had
discretion to distribute some or all of the trust income and/or principal to a person
alive at the time of the trust’s creation). But see SLA 2000 ch. 17 § 9, eff. Apr. 22,
2000 (repealing Alaska Stat. § 34.27.050(a) and replacing it with Alaska Stat.
§ 34.27.051 that permits a 1,000 year period in gross for the exercise or nonexercise of a general power of appointment not presently exercisable because of a
condition precedent) and Alaska Stat. § 34.27.100 (retaining limit on suspension
of power of alienation to 30 years).
48. For a general history of the firm, see ELLEN JOAN POLLACK, TURKS AND
BRAHMINS: UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK, TWEED: WALL STREET’S GENTLEMEN TAKE OFF
THEIR GLOVES (1990).
49. Bridget J. Crawford, On Perpetuities, Paradigms, and a Creative Life in
the Law, TAX NOTES 289, 289–90 (2016) (interview with Jonathan G. Blattmachr).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 290 (describing obstacles to enactment in New York State).
52. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Veit, Note, Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts and the
Alaska Trust Act: Has Alaska Moved Offshore? 16 ALASKA L. REV. 269 (1999)
(providing overview of the Alaska Trust Act, including its legislative history).
53. See Sterk, supra note 44, at 1051–55.
54. See, e.g., NENNO & SULLLIVAN, T.M. 867, supra note 40, Worksheet 4 State
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C. Twenty-First Century Trust Law Critiques

Critics of perpetual trusts offer a variety of objections,
including that the law encourages all trustees to invest
conservatively.55 Others claim that perpetual trusts create a
monied aristocracy that is inconsistent with notions of equal
opportunity.56 Still others frame their opposition in terms of
intergenerational equity, saying that each major age cohort should
be able to decide for itself whether and how to dispose of trust
property.57 And others point to the lost tax revenue from perpetual
trusts.58 Simply stated, in the case of a trust that lasts forever, if
the trust assets never vest in a beneficiary’s estate, the assets will
not be subject to wealth transfer taxation when they become
available to the next generation.59
Focusing on the law’s tolerance of perpetual trusts, it is
reasonable to ask who “wins” and who “loses.” At the most basic
level, the government loses, in the sense that it is unable to collect
wealth transfer tax revenue if a trust never terminates.60 Wealthy
people win because they can stay or get wealthier if they do not
pay taxes.61 Beyond the losses to the federal tax coffers and
Perpetuities Statutes.
55. See Haskell, supra note 46, at 558–59 (arguing that trustees tend to
invest conservatively). This argument has less purchase in light of the enactment
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act that allows the trustee to evaluate trust
investments “in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an
overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited
to the trust.” Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1994).
56. Ray Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010,
at A19.
57. See, e.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58–59
(1955). Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that many perpetual trusts grant each
generation a limited power of appointment to dispose of trust property. See
Bridget J. Crawford, Who’s Afraid of Perpetual Trusts, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 79, 86–87 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569, 570 (2000) (describing long-term trusts as
mechanisms for avoiding generation-skipping transfer tax).
59. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset Preservation and the
Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 257,
280–85 (2015) (explaining estate tax savings of completed lifetime gifts to longterm or perpetual trusts).
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
61. For the period 1964 to 1994, wealth transfer taxes never represented
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wealthy people staying rich (or becoming richer), consider,
however, whether there might be other “losers” in this so-called
low point in American trust jurisprudence.62 Or, to reframe the
question: Why do the U.S. political and legal systems tolerate
trusts? It seems clear that both trust and trusts are deeply
implicated in the answer, but perhaps not in ways that traditional
critics might think.
IV. Why Tolerate Trusts?
A. Trusts and Wealth Inequality
Just as termites can slowly and steadily damage a home over
a period of years before the harm suddenly becomes visible,63 the
beneficial form of ownership known as a trust has gradually—and
now suddenly—morphed nearly beyond recognition through the
repeal of the rule against perpetuities, along with the other
changes.64 Traditional trust limitations have been eaten away.
Trusts—except ones for minors or disabled beneficiaries65—are all
based in some sort of desire to work around some law, most often
the tax law.66 Simply put, then, to the extent that trusts enable
individuals to minimize or avoid taxation, then trusts certainly
play some role in maintaining wealth inequality.67
more than 2.33% of all federal tax revenue. See Christopher E. Erblich, Recent
Development: To Bury Federal Transfer Taxes Without Further Adieu, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1994). In 2017, the estate tax generated 0.7% of all
revenue. Scott Eastman, New IRS Data Reiterates Shortcomings of the Estate Tax,
TAX FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y2qqho7r (last visited Mar. 30,
2019) (showing sharp decline in estate tax revenue since 2000) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates
Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y3ozj94k (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (estimating further
decline in number of returns and gross estate tax owed in wake of Tax Cut and
Jobs Act of 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See Sterk, supra note 44 (calling the contemporary trust law a “race to
the bottom”).
63. See supra Part II.
64. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (excluding trusts for
minors and disabled beneficiaries from discussion).
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. See generally Felix B. Chang, Assymetries in the Generation and
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Wealth inequality in the U.S. is staggering.68 The gap between
the rich and the poor is only getting larger.69 Trust lawyers should
name and own their role in contributing to that inequality.70
Consider, for example, data from the Congressional Budget Office
for the period 1993 to 2013.71 During that time period, the richest
10% of all families went from holding approximately 30% of all
household wealth in this country to holding 76% of all family
wealth.72 The poorest 50% of families did not gain or lose much.73
Families in between the top 10% to top 15% gained about 9
points.74 But the big “winners” during this period were families in
Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 93–98 (2018) (considering perpetual
trusts in context of wealth redistribution concerns). But see Jonathan G.
Blattmachr & Martin M. Shenkman, Trump Wins, A Brave New World for Estate
Planners, ULTIMATE ESTATE PLANNER (Dec. 1, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y22trqhq
(last updated Mar. 30, 2019) (“[S]tatistics as to the concentration of wealth in the
U.S. suggest that the estate tax has not been particularly successful at dampening
wealth concentration.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See, e.g., THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 304–
76 (2014) (documenting historic increase in wealth inequality, especially
post-1980).
69. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the
United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 37–38
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20265, 2014), available at
http:// www.nber.org/papers/w20625 (showing increase in wealth inequality over
time).
70. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial
Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 879–89 (2013) (discussing what the legal
profession can do to promote economic inequality, including increasing minority
homeownership and developing model laws that will promote equality). I include
myself in this group, as I was a Trusts & Estates Associate at Milbank LLP from
1996 to 2003.
71. Trends in Family Wealth, 1989 to 2013, Congressional Budget Office,
CBO (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51846 (last visited Apr. 1,
2019) (segmenting aggregate national wealth of $67 trillion by population,
illustrating that the top 10 percent of all families held 76 percent of all wealth in
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. Measuring wealth concentration is hardly a settled matter. See, e.g,
Wojciech Kopczuk, What Do We Know About the Evolution of Top Wealth Shares
in the United States?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2015, at 47, 53–57 (describing and
identifying limitations of three different measures of wealth inequality).
73. Trends in Family Wealth, supra note 71 (bottom 50% of households
declined in wealth from 1989 to 2013).
74. Id. (“The share of wealth held by families in the top 10 percent of the
wealth distribution increased from 67 percent to 76 percent, whereas the share of
wealth held by families in the bottom half of the distribution declined from 3
percent to 1 percent.”).
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the top 10%; they saw their share of wealth multiply two and onehalf times.75
Wealth inequality must be understood not just in terms of
individuals or families generically, but also with respect to race
and other identifying characteristics.76 According to the Institute
for Policy Studies, the 400 individuals who comprise the Forbes list
of the richest people in America hold as much wealth as all African
American households combined with one-third of all Latinx
households.77 To better visualize this disparity, picture 400
people—a group that might fill a medium-sized high school
auditorium.78 It is possible to fill that auditorium with individuals
in this country who have as much or more wealth than
approximately 23 million people of color.79
Wealth statistics also break down along other identity lines.80
There are countless ways to analyze the data.81 The message is the
same: Wealth in this country is concentrated in the hands of the
few.82

75.
76.

Id.
See, e.g., Dedrick Asante-Muhammad et al., The Ever-Growing Gap,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Aug. 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y22ytyff (last
visited Mar. 30, 2019) (comparing aggregate wealth of members of Forbes list with
U.S. African-American and Latinx populations) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
77. Asante-Muhammad, supra note 76 at 6 (“America’s richest 400
individuals—with a collective net worth of $2.34 trillion—now own more wealth
than the entire Black population, plus one-third of the Latino population,
combined.”).
78. See, e.g., Auditorium, Colville (WA) High School and About Colville High
School, http://chs.colsd.org/auditorium (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (showing size
and layout of 400-person auditorium for a high school with a student enrollment
of approximately 535) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. Asante-Muhammad, supra note 76 at 6.
80. See, e.g., Lucie Schmidt & Purvi Sevak, Gender, Marriage, and Asset
Accumulation in the United States, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 139, 142–45 (2006)
(showing single women are less wealthy than single men in United States).
81. See, e.g., Wealth Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG,
https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality/#racial-wealth-divide (last visited
Apr. 1, 2019) (showing that combined wealth of Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos and Warren
Buffet is greater than all wealth held by bottom half of all Americans) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See, e.g., Saez & Zucman, supra note 69 (showing historic trends in
increasingly concentrated wealth in the U.S.).
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Revenue may not be the most important “loss” from legal
innovations that impede the taxation of transfers in trust.83
Wealth transfer taxes represent a tiny percentage of all federal tax
revenue.84 The greater loss related to perpetual trusts, to give just
one example, is the expressive value of taxing wealth as it passes
from generation to generation or accumulates over time.85 Because
all of these referenced trust innovations are in their relative
infancy, it is difficult to predict what the actual impact will be on
wealthy individuals’ behavior.86 So any concern is better framed
less about what the trusts actually do and more about what they
symbolize.
Trusts—and the seeming antidote to them, the estate tax—
both have expressive value.87 The estate tax has a transparent
intent: redistribution of wealth.88 Trusts, especially perpetual
trusts, are an easy target.89 Breaking up concentrations of wealth,
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining how wealth
transfer taxes represent a declining portion of already small percentage of federal
tax revenue).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 2413, 2413–14 (2016) (discussing the expressive value of
taxation).
86. But see Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes,
115 YALE L.J. 356, 410–11 (2005) (estimating that from 1997 through 2003,
wealthy individuals transferred approximately $1 billion of assets to trusts in
jurisdictions that had abolished the rule against perpetuities).
87. Trusts might, in fact, signal a lack of trust (and with good reason), in the
case of a spendthrift beneficiary or one with a drug habit. See, e.g., Christian
Kelso, But What’s an Ascertainable Standard? Clarifying HEMS Distribution
Standards and Other Fiduciary Considerations for Trustees, 10 EST. PLAN. & COM.
PROP. L. J. 1, 58 (providing sample trust language prohibiting trustee from
making distribution of any trust property if the beneficiary engages in illegal drug
use).
88. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed an annual wealth
tax of 2 to 3 percent. See Paul Krugman, Elizabeth Warren Does Teddy Roosevelt,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/opinion/elizabeth-warren-taxplan.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2019) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See, e.g., Paul Sullivan, The Ins and Outs of Trust That Last Forever,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/yourmoney/estate-planning/the-ins-and-outs-of-perpetual-trusts.html (last updated
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the seeming goal of the estate tax,90 is a natural extension of the
notion, ideal, or even lesson communicated to children that the
United States has or should have a democratic, egalitarian society
in which there is one person, one vote, and equal opportunity for
all.91
More likely, however, the political and legal systems tolerate
trusts because of a lesser explored part of that same meritocracy
story. If anyone can be anything in the United States92—a place
lacking a formal nobility,93 a country where an immigrant can go
from rags to riches,94 and a land that fosters the creative spirit of
a college drop-out who builds a multi-million dollar company in his
garage95—then maybe anyone might become rich through hard
work and effort. Just as a significant percentage of the population
thinks the estate tax applies to them or their families96 (in fact, it
Dec. 5, 2014) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“Critics of perpetual trusts have argued
against them on moral grounds—saying tying up money for generations is bad
public policy and could lead to a virtual aristocracy.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
90. See, e.g., Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX
L. REV. 223, 235–36 (1956) (describing goal of wealth transfer tax as disrupting
wealth concentration).
91. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inauguraladdress-president-barack-obama (last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (last visited Apr. 1,
2019) (“We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty
knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she is
an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in
our own.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. See, e.g., CHARLES M. SCHULZ, YOU CAN BE ANYTHING! (2009) (collection of
Peanuts cartoons showing Snoopy in a variety of professional and personal roles)
93. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art, I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[n]o Title of Nobility shall be
granted by the United States”).
94. See, e.g., Andrea Navarro, Billionaire Immigrants Who Struck it Rich in
the
U.S.,
FORBES.COM,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreanavarro/
2014/03/19/billionaire-immigrants-who-struck-it-rich-in-the-u-s/#2686f5b6764a
(last updated Mar. 19, 2014) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (profiling eight U.S.
immigrants who are now billionaires) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
95. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. BECRAFT, BILL GATES: A BIOGRAPHY (2014)
(describing the origins of Microsoft when Paul Allen and Bill Gates, who left
Harvard College without graduating, began a company called “Micro-Soft” in an
Albuquerque garage in 1975).
96. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
FIGHTING OVER INHERITED WEALTH 79–81 (2005) (describing how calling the
estate tax a “death tax” causes non-wealthy Americans to become interested in—
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applies only to those with estates of more than $11.4 million, if
single, or $22.8 million if married),97 a significant percentage of
Americans likely think, “I might need a trust one day.” Thus, the
legal (and practical) tolerance for trusts is entirely consistent with
the American mythology that anyone can become anything,
including rich and in need of a trust.
Imagine a legal regime in which all of the changes to
substantive trust law of the last twenty-five years—perpetual
trusts, self-settled asset protection trust and trust decanting—
disappeared overnight. It is possible to conceive of a system that
allows trusts only for those who are unable to manage money for
themselves, because of age or disability.98 Such changes unlikely
would deter wealthy people from finding different ways to reduce
their tax bills.99 If the government closes off one avenue for
minimizing taxes, then smart, well-paid lawyers will find other
ways to accomplish the same results.100 That cat-and-mouse game
is built into the very structure of the U.S. tax system.101
Most of the well-known changes to the U.S. trust law in the
last twenty-five years do not represent a great threat to
democracy.102 Citizens, lawyers and policy-makers who are
committed to a fair and just society instead should turn their
attention to a far lesser-known change to the law in the State of
Louisiana. This change links more subtly and more profoundly to

and object to—the tax).
97. See I.R.C. § 2010 (unified credit against estate tax that essentially
“shelters” transfers of these amounts).
98. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
99. Popular self-help books employ this language unabashedly. See, e.g.,
MARK TABAK, ANYONE CAN BE RICH! A PSYCHIATRIST PROVIDES THE MENTAL TOOLS
TO BUILD YOUR WEALTH (2017).
100. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-12-21-03encounter-the-loophole-artist.html?smid=pl-share (last updated Dec. 21, 2003)
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (noting that there are “thousands of lawyers and tax
engineers who, with [any one particular] tax repealed, would put their minds to
work helping the rich pay less”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
101. See, e.g., id. (“[The tax planner's] cat-and-mouse game is to work the
loopholes in the system until the government finds them and draws them
closed.”).
102. See infra Part III.B.
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problems with contemporary political and legal structures in the
U.S.
V. Human Embryos in Trust: The Case of Sofia Vergara
Louisiana law treats as legal "persons" human embryos
created through artificial reproductive technology.103 The statute
provides that an “in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a
juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is
implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to
an unborn child in accordance with law.”104 As a juridical person,
the fertilized ovum has the capacity to become a legal party to a
lawsuit, for example.105 Louisiana law specifies that a fertilized
human egg is not property, but rather “a biological human being,”
and if the “donors of the sperm and ovum” choose to “express their
identity,” then they have all of the rights that parents have under
Louisiana law.106 The standard for adjudicating any disputes over
the genetic material is the “best interest of the in vitro fertilized
ovum.”107
Curiously, even though Louisiana law defines human eggs
fertilized in vitro as “not property,” Louisiana law appears to
permit these embryos to be transferred to and held in a trust.108
This treatment is not the result of an affirmative statement in the
Louisiana trust law itself, but rather the statutory default rule
that unless the governing instrument provides otherwise, a trustee
may hold any type of property.109 In Louisiana, human embryos
103. Although several states have accorded “personhood” status to fetuses,
Louisiana appears to be the only state that grants legal personhood to human
eggs fertilized by means of assisted reproductive technology. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6732 (2018) (“The life of each human being begins at fertilization . . . [and]
unborn children have interests in life, health and well-being that should be
protected . . . .”).
104. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2019) (legal capacity of in vitro fertilized human
ovum as juridical person).
105. Id. § 9:124 (“As a juridical person, the in vitro fertilized human ovum
shall be given an identification by the medical facility for use within the medical
facility which entitles such ovum to sue or be sued.”).
106. Id. § 9:126 (ownership of in vitro fertilized ovum).
107. Id. § 9:132.
108. Id. § 9:1737.
109. Conflicting characterization of human bodily materials as “property” or
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created by artificial reproductive technology are simultaneously
“not property” for some purposes and “property” for other
purposes.110
This changing nature of human bodily material as notproperty to property (and vice versa) is not unknown in the law,
but usually relates to when a patient has made a decision to part
with certain bodily fluid or material for medical research
purposes.111 Whether embryos are “property” for purposes of
inheritance and equitable distribution upon divorce are questions
that different jurisdictions continue to answer inconsistently.112
But Louisiana appears to be the only state that explicitly labels as
juridical persons human eggs fertilized through artificial
reproduction. 113 If those juridical persons can be held in trust, at
first glance, the trust would seem to violate the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition against slavery. 114 Yet the entrustment
of embryos has not been the subject of challenge under Louisiana
(or any other) law.115
Granting legal personhood status to embryos created through
artificial reproductive technology represents a creative legal
victory by those who believe that life begins at the moment of
conception.116 These are people who believe that fertilized embryos
“not property” is not unknown in the law. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Our
Bodies, Our Tax Selves, 31 VA. TAX REV. 695, 699–717 (2012).
110. Supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990) (finding that patient had no property interest in his own bodily cells
used for medical research, but that the scientists who developed products from
the patient’s cells had a property interest in them).
112. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House
(and the Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce,
57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1177 (2009).
113. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-40 (2019) (defining an “embryo” as “an
individual fertilized ovum of the human species from the single-cell stage to eightweek development”).
114. See, e.g., Emma and Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1, et_al, v. Vergara,
No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct. Jefferson Par., Dec. 7, 2016)
(permitting trustee holding two embryos to bring legal action, with no apparent
objection to legality of trust arrangement).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of
Science, Law, Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L. Q 599, 610 (explaining that some
religious groups’ objections to destruction of fertilized eggs).
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have the same rights as a child, and the rights of those embryos
are superior to the couple’s right to have the embryos destroyed,
and, by extension, a pregnant woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion.117 Many Americans sincerely and deeply hold these
views; others do not.118 All perspectives deserve fair evaluation,
taking into account the balancing of rights—and of majoritarian
and minority interests—that necessarily must occur in a
democracy.119
But shifting from a macro-political analysis to a more groundeye-view of trusts, consider the ongoing legal dispute between
television star Sofia Vergara and her former romantic partner Nick
Loeb.120 When they were engaged to be married, the couple agreed
to in vitro fertilization that led to the creation of two viable
embryos in November, 2013.121 The couple decided to freeze the
embryos.122 After the couple broke up in May, 2014, they could not
agree about what to do with the embryos, which are stored in a
medical facility in California.123 The legal agreement they entered
into prior to the creation of the embryos does not permit either
party to use the embryos without the other’s consent.124 In fact, the
agreement provides that if the parties cannot agree about the
continued “storage, use or disposition” of the embryos, the genetic
material is deemed to be “abandoned to the medical facility.”125
117. See, e.g., Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, Embryonic Human Persons:
Talking Point on Morality and Human Embryo Research, 10 EMBO REP. 301, 303
(2009) (“embryological evidence shows that the human embryo is a whole,
although obviously immature, human being; it is not a mere part”)
118. See, e.g., Abortion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion
.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing percentage of Americans who believe
abortions should be legal in some [50 percent], all [18 percent] or no circumstances
[29%] has remained relatively constant for the period 1976 to 2018) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 153 (1980) (“We are a
nation of minorities and our system thus depends on the ability and willingness
of various groups to apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind them
into a majority on a given issue.”).
120. See Petition of Plaintiff, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at ¶¶19–55.
121. Id. at ¶ 51.
122. Id. at ¶ 54.
123. Id. at ¶¶ 60–62.
124. Id. at ¶ 48.
125. Id. at ¶ 49 (citing Form Directive signed by both parties, attached as
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After the termination of the parties’ romantic relationship,
Loeb sought Vergara’s permission to have the embryos implanted
into a gestational surrogate, but Vergara did not consent.126 Loeb
then brought suit in Los Angeles, California against both Vergara
and the medical facility, asserting his parental rights over the
embryos.127 He dropped that lawsuit on December 6, 2016, after
Vergara’s counsel sought in discovery the names of two former
romantic partners of Loeb who had undergone abortions.128
On December 7, 2016—the day after the California case was
dismissed—Loeb filed a petition in the District Court of Louisiana,
24th Judicial District, Jefferson Parish.129 Some time during the
California proceedings, Loeb had established sufficient contacts
with the jurisdiction of Louisiana to be able to avail himself of the
state law that grants legal personhood status to embryos created
through artificial reproductive technology.130 He created a trust
under Louisiana law on November 30, 2016, and on December 5,
2016, he modified the trust to benefit the embryos, if one or both
developed into a live baby, and gave the embryos the names
“Emma” and “Isabella.”131
The plaintiffs in Loeb’s Louisiana case are denominated as
“Human Embryo # 4 HB-A (‘Emma’),” “Human Embryo #3 HB-A
(‘Isabella’)” and the “Trustee of the Emma and Isabella Trust No.
1.”132 According to its terms, the trust becomes irrevocable if and
when either or both embryos develop into fetuses and are born
Exhibit A to Petition).
126. Id. at ¶ 62.
127. Id. at ¶ 67. See also Complaint, Loeb v. Vergara and ART Reproductive
Center, Inc. (Super. Ct. Cal. L.A. Co. 2014).
128. See Petition of Plaintiff, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at ¶ 68.
129. See id. at ¶¶19–55.
130. See, e.g., Transcript, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 17 (in
response to question of whether Loeb created the trust immediately prior to filing
suit in Louisiana, counsel responded that “Mr. Loeb himself has sufficient
contacts and reason why he's bringing the—why he created the trust here in
Louisiana. There's plenty of information that shows that.”). A federal District
Court later found that Loeb is a citizen of Florida. Order and Reasons, Emma &
Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. Vergara, ECF 2:17-cv-01498 at 2.
131. See Order and Reasons, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 5.
132. Id.
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alive.133 At that time, they will become the sole discretionary
beneficiaries of the trust.134 Loeb’s petition states that the embryos
have the expectation of an inheritance from Vergara, and
Vergara’s refusal to allow the embryos to develop into fetuses (and
then be born) effectively denies them their inheritance.135
The case was removed from the 24th Judicial District,
Jefferson Parish, upon petition by Vergara,136 and the case was
assigned to the federal District Court. There, Vergara successfully
argued for dismissal of the case on the grounds that she is not
subject to general or specific jurisdiction in Louisiana.137
In January 2018, Loeb brought another suit against Vergara
in Louisiana.138 The case was transferred to federal District Court
where Loeb then sued for custody of the embryos under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and
motioned for removal of the case back to state court.139 Vergara
motioned to dismiss the case, arguing that such law does not apply
to the embryos and, even if it did, she is not subject to jurisdiction
in Louisiana.140
133. Id. at ¶¶ 75–76
134. Id. at ¶ 77. It is not clear whether there are other current beneficiaries
of the trust, whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable, and how Loeb could
transfer the embryos to the trust when the embryos remain in medical storage in
California. Also, if neither Loeb nor Vergara is permitted by the terms of the
agreement to use the embryos without the other’s consent, supra note 124, then
Loeb’s transfer of the embryos to the trust would violate the agreement.
135. Id. at ¶¶163–177 (alleging that Vergara is “required to provide for [the
embryos’] care and administration, that the trust was created “for the express
purpose of benefitting Emma and Isabella and providing for their health,
education, maintenance and support” and that Vergara’s refusal to allow the
embryos to be implanted in a surrogate “caused and continues to cause [the
embryos] financial harm”).
136. Notice of Removal, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara (La. Dist. Ct., Feb. 21, 2017).
137. Order and Reasons, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v.
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 1, 10–12.
138. Loeb, Human Embryo #3 HB-A, and Human Embryo #4 HB-A v.
Vergara, 25th Jud. Dist. Parish of Paquimines No. 64-217A.
139. First Amended Complaint for Sole Child Custody, Loeb et al. v. Vergara,
Case 2:18CV03165 (D. La. Apr. 17, 2018) and Order and Reasons, 2:18CV03165
(D. La. May 18, 2018) (grant of motion to remand to 25th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Plaquemines, State of Louisiana).
140. Loeb et al. v. Vergara, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim, 2:18CV03165 (D. La. May 1, 2018).
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Loeb opposed Vergara’s motion to dismiss in a way that
curiously—although obliquely—raises the issue this Essay
identifies: There is a contradiction between treating the embryos
both as “persons,” in the sense of allowing them to sue, and as
“property,” by allowing them to be held in the very trust Loeb
created.141 Specifically, Loeb urges the court to recognize that
Louisiana law accords to fertilized eggs the same status as human
beings, even though other states do not, and that this split in state
law harkens back to pre-Civil War treatment of African Americans
as slaves by some states and not by others. He compares the case
of the entrusted embryos to the case of Solomon Northup, the free
man from New York sold into slavery in Louisiana in 1841 whose
memoir was the basis for the film 12 Years a Slave:142
There was a question at the time as to whether New York had
the jurisdiction to reach into Louisiana and retrieve Northup
but the New York governor discussed it with Louisiana officials
and they were allowed to retrieve him . . . . [L]egislation in most
states on this issue [means] state courts are left to decide if
embryos are human beings or property or something in
between.

Loeb’s analogy of embryos to slaves is problematic, historically
flawed, and entirely confusing.143 His comparison of the embryos
to Simon Northup is equally puzzling, given it is Loeb himself that
created the trust for (or for the benefit of) the embryos.144 The
District Court has remanded the case to the state court.145
141. See supra notes 103–115 and accompanying text.
142. 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency Enterprises et al. 2013). See also The
Kidnapping Case: Narrative of the Seizure and Recovery of Solomon Northup,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
20,1853),https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1853/01/20/751239
62.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Orville Vernon Burton, The Creation and Destruction of the
Fourteenth Amendment During the Long Civil War, 79 LA. L. REV. 189, 216–34
(2018) (describing significant judicial reluctance to recognizing and enforcing
rights of former slaves during post-war era).
144. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
145. Order and Reasons, Loeb et al. v. Vergara, Case 2:18CV03165 (D. La.
May 18, 2018) (granting Loeb’s motion to remand to state court). In the meantime,
Vergara sued Loeb in California for breach of contract and malicious prosecution
related to his attempt to assert his rights over the embryos. Complaint, Vergara
v. Loeb, Super. Ct. BC650580. On appeal of the lower court’s denial of Loeb’s
motion to strike, Vergara’s malicious prosecution claim has been dismissed, but
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Trusts for embryos are not unique to Louisiana. One
Mississippi lawyer markets to clients a “Fertility Preservation
Trust,” at a cost of $850, to provide “a detailed plan for your
embryos now and well into the future.”146 If such a “fertility trust”
and the trust created by Loeb in Louisiana are traditional private
express trusts, then there persists the inherent contradiction
between Louisiana’s view that embryos are legal “persons” and
allowing persons to be held in trust.147 It is possible that the word
“trust” in the context of embryos is being used euphemistically,
with the “trust” being a legal equivalent of a guardianship
arrangement, and the trustee is performing the functions that a
guardian ad litem would in other jurisdictions.148 Even so, consider
the significance of injecting a trust into legal disputes over genetic
material created via assisted reproductive technology when
Louisiana law buttresses those disputes by recognizing a fertilized
egg as a legal person.149
Trusts for embryos obscure debates about the legal rights, if
any, that should attach from the moment of conception, how those
rights conflict with the decision to become a parent or not, and
what limits there are to a woman’s right to decide what happens
with her own body.150 Trusts obscure and make inaccessible what
should be serious discussions about reproductive rights. Trust talk
pushes those legal, political, ethical, moral, and even religious
conversations further away from venues and language that are
accessible to most people.151 Trusts for embryos are far more
her breach of contract claim may go forward. Vergara v. Loeb, 2019 WL 337817
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Co., Jan. 28, 2019) (unpublished/noncitable opinion).
146. See
Ashley
W.
Pittman,
Fertility
Preservation
Trust,
https://trustfertility.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (on file with the Wasington
and Lee Law Review). The trust appears to be fully revocable during the lifetime
of the creator or creators; see Ashley W. Pittman, Benefits of a Trust,
https://trustfertility.com/benefits (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., John Crouch, The Child’s Attorney, 26 FAM. ADVOC. 31 (2004)
(describing the difference between guardians ad litem and attorneys for children).
149. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood
Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 573 (2013)
(exploring multiple implications of embryo personhood language for pregnant
women or users of reproductive technology).
151. Cf. Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting Life
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insidious and harmful to the U.S. political and legal systems—far
more termite-like—than any loss of revenue from perpetual
trusts.152
VI. Conclusion
Once one identifies the fault lines in a political system, the
next question is what individuals and communities can do to repair
them. To the extent that trusts of property have anti-democratic
effects, there is an argument to minimize or discourage their use
for wealth transfer purposes or to make them entirely unavailable
except in cases of minor or disabled beneficiaries.153 Certainly, the
Louisiana law that permits trusts for embryos shows what lengths
that opposing sides will go when they can no longer have civil
conversations with each other to achieve legal compromises
acceptable to most people. Trusts should not be deployed as
weapons in the culture wars.
Lawyers need to be attuned to both trust and trusts in society.
Measuring and monitoring both reveal what most needs repairing
in the foundation of society. If a community, group or system has
been damaged through multiple termite bites, the time is ripe to
deploy multiple clusters of metaphorical spiders to restore it.
Consider, for example, that approximately one-half of all spiders
build webs for the purpose of catching prey.154 But spider webs also
play a role in maintaining social communities155 and providing
physical security to the aphids.156 Through individual and
and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 800 (1995) (discussing
direct democracy on important questions linked to religion or ethics).
152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. See supra notes 65–83 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Jonas O. Wolff et al., The Great Silk Alternative: Multiple Coevolution of Web Loss and Sticky Hairs in Spiders n. 9, PLOS ONE (last updated
May 1, 2013) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0062682 (noting many spiders never developed
web-making capabilities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
155. See, e.g., Ingi Agnarsson, Spider Webs as Habitat Patches: The
Distribution of Kelptoparasites (Argyrodes, Theridiiidae) Among Host Webs
(Nephilia, Tetragnathidae), 31 J. OF ARACHNOLOGY 344, 344 (describing spider
webs as “habitat patches” for multiple spider communities).
156. See, e.g., Bengt Gunnarsson, Bird Predation on Spiders: Ecological
Mechanism and Evolutionary Consequences, 25 J. OF ARACHNOLOGY 509

LESS TRUST MEANS MORE TRUST

99

collective interactions, communications and efforts to build webs
to connect to each other, it is possible to create presumptions of
wisdom, goodwill and ethics. In terms of tensile strength, a spider’s
web is stronger than a steel cable.157 Political and legal structures
in the U.S., like a spider web, are both fragile but strong. Termites
destroy structures.158 Spiders create new and better places to
dwell.159 Democracy, trust and trusts need spiders, not termites.

(describing how spider webs operate as defense mechanisms).
157. See, e.g., Courtney Miceli, Spider Silk is Five Times Stronger Than Steel,
SCIENCEMAG.ORG, (last updated Nov. 20, 2018) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019)
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/11/spider-silk-five-times-stronger-steelnow-scientists-know-why (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. Supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text.
159. Supra note 156.

